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Power and P r o b a b i l i t y  
The a r e a  of  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  power i s  b e s e t  by a hand i -  
c a p  t h a t  a n a l y s t s  o f  community, n a t i o n a l ,  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
power have  been a b l e  t o  a v o i d .  The h a n d i c a p  i s  t h e  a p p a r e n t -  
l y  i n n o c e n t  a s sumpt ion  t h a t  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  power s h o u l d  be  
t h o u g h t  o f , a s  t h e  power t h a t  one i n d i v i d u a l  has o v e r  a n o t h e r .  
Even when it i s  r e c o g n i z e d ,  as it  f r e q u e n t l y  i s ,  t h a t  such 
power r e l a t i o n s  may b e  a  two-way s t r e e t ,  t h e  assumpt ion  re- 
mains  a s t r a i g h t - j a c k e t .  
The problem w i t h  t h i n k i n g  o f  power as a r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between p e o p l e  i s  t h a t  it d e p r i v e s  t h e  d i s c o u r s e  o f  a n  i n t e l -  
l e c t u a l  a p p a r a t u s  t h a t  h a s  proved v e r y  u s e f u l  i n  t a l k i n g  
a b o u t  power r e l a t i o n s  i n  l a r g e r  u n i t s , .  Only t h e  s l i g h t e s t  
. . .  
change i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  make t h i s  a p p a r a t u s  a v a i l a b l e .  F i r s t ,  
l e t ' s  speak of power o v e r  b e h a v i o r  r a t h e r  t h a n ' p o w e r  o v e r  
a  p e r s o n ,  T h i s  means t h a t  we r e l i n q u i s h  o u r  c l a i m  t o  be 
d e a l i n g  w i t h  changes  i n  a t t i t u d e s ,  v a l u e s ,  l e a r n i n g ,  and 
o t h e r  i n t e r n a l  s ta tes  excep t  i n  s o  f a r  as  w e  must invoke  
such  c o n c e p t s  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  mechanisms by which power oper-  
a tes  on b e h a v i o r .  We l e a v e  t h e  domain o f  e x p l a i n i n g  
changes  i n  i n t e r n a l  s t a t e s  t o  o t h e r  s u b - f i e l d s  o f  s o c i a l  
psychology -- mora l  and c o g n i t i v e  deve lopment ,  v a l u e  and 
a t t i t u d e  c h a n g e ,  and t h e  l i k e .  
Second,  l e t ' s  t h i n k  a b o u t  t h e  b e h a v i o r  b e i n g  e x p l a i n e d  
i n  a s p e c i f i c  way -- a s  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  o r  t h e  c h o i c e  among 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  t h a t  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  makes. T h i s  i s  h a r d l y  any 
' l i m i t  a t  a l l  because  it i s  a s i m i l e  m a t t e r  t o  c a s t  most be- 
h a v i o r  i n  t h e s e  t e r m s .  V i r t u a l l y - a n y  a c t i o n  may be  viewed 
as an  i m p l i c i t . c h o i c e  among p o s s i b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  even i f  
' .  t h e  o t h e r  members o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  s e t  were n e v e r  c o n s c i o u s -  
l y  c o n s i d e r e d ,  Many c h o i c e s  w i l l  be  t r i v i a l  o n e s  o f  l i t t l e  
i n t e r e s t  o r  c o n c e r n  s o  we must s p e c i f y  t h e  domain t h a t  i s  
. i m p o r t a n t  t o  u s  -- t h e  c h o i c e  o f  a p o l i t i c a l  c a n d i d a t e  t o  
v o t e  f o r ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  t a k e  a j o b  o r  buy a  p r o d u c t ,  t h e  
c h o i c e  of a p o l i c y  t o  a d v o c a t e  and s u p p o r t ,  and s o  f o r t h .  
What I am p r o p o s i n g  i s  t h a t  we r e d e f i n e  t h e  t a s k  o f  
a n  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  power a n a l y s i s .  I n s t e a d  o f  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  
make s t a t e m e n t s  a b o u t  how much o r  what k i n d  o f  power A h a s  
o v e r  B ,  we shou ld  speak  i n s t e a d  o f  how much and what k i n d  
o f  power A h a s  o v e r  a s p e c i f i e d  domain o f  B ' s  d e c i s i o n s .  
The d i v i d e n d  we r e c e i v e  f o r  t h i s  change i$ t h e  employment 
o f  t h e  h i g h l y  u s e f u l  c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n  o f  power as a change 
i n  p r o b a b i l i t y .  
The P r o b a b i l i t y  Concep t ion  o f  Power 
The expl icandum f o r  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  power a n a l y s i s  i s  . t h e  
se t  o f  d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  makes. But o n l y  p a r t  
:,< .<? 
o f  t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  l i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  r e a l m  of power. Many 
e f f e c t s  on a  p e r s o n ' s  d e c i s i o n s  may have  n o t h i n g  t o  d o  w i t h  
t h e  b e h a v i o r  o f  o t h e r  a c t o r s  b u t  may re f lec t  h i s  i n t e r n a l  
r 
s t a t e s ,  n a t u r a l  e v e n t s ,  t h e  p h y s i c a l  env i ronment ,  and s o  
f o r t h .  C l e a r l y ,  a power e x p l a n a t i o n  h a s  c e r t a i n  more s p e c i f i c  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  
For  a n  i n t u i t i v e  f e e l i n g  o f  where t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  
l i e s ,  I l i k e  t h e  s t o r y  abou t  t h e  man who e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  
and r e p e a t e d l y  t h r e w  b i t s  of  newspaper i n  t h e  s t r e e t .  One 
morning,  a  woman who had watched t h i s  per formance  f o r  sev-  
e r a l  months approached him and a s k e d  him what he w a s  d o i n g .  
" I ' m  t h r o w i n g  t h i s  p a p e r  down t o  keep  t h e  e l e p h a n t s  o u t  o f  
t h e  s t r e e t . s Y 1 '  he  t o l d   he^, "But t h e r e  a r e  no e l e p h a n t s  
i n  t h e  s t r e e t s  ,"  s h e  reproached  him. "That ' s r i g h t  ,"  
h e  s a i d  t r i u m p h a n t l y ,  " E f f e c t i v e ,  i s n ' t  i t .  " 
C l e a r l y ,  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  power must imply some change 
o v e r  t h e  k i n d  o f  d e c i s i o n  t h a t  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  o r  a n  e l e p h a n t  
would make i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  of  such  power e x e r c i s e .  But what 
o f  a s i t u a t i o n  i n  which I would p r o b a b l y  have  vo ted  f o r  
C a n d i d a t e  X anyway b u t  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  my c o n v e r s a t i o n  w i t h  
a  r e s p e c t e d  f r i e n d  I became more c e r t a i n  o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n ?  
S u r e l y  t h e r e  i s  some k i n d  o f  i n f l u e n c e  o r  power b e i n g  e x e r -  
c i s e d  h e r e  b u t  can  one  s a y  my d e c i s i o n  was a l t e r e d  s i n c e  I 
p r o b a b l y  would have vo ted  t h e  same way anyway? 
We c a n  s a y  t h i s  q u i t e  e a s i l y  i f  we c o n c e i v e  o f  t h e  ex- 
e r c i s e  o f  power a s  a n  a c t  which i n c r e a s e s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
t h a t  I w i l l  choose  a p r e f e r r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e  o f  t h e  i n f l u e n c e r .  
To c o n c e i v e  o f  i n f l u e n c e  as a  s h i f t  o f  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  one of 
Rober t  D a h l ' s  . ( I 9 5 7 1  s e v e r a l  m a g n i f i c e n t  and s e m i n a l  c o n t r i -  
I b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  a r e a  o f  power a n a l y s i s .  I n  t h e  example above,  
Some p e o p l e  i n c o r r e c t l y  c r e d i t  Weber w i t h  t h i s  i d e a  be-. 
c a u s e  he  spoke o f  power a s  "The p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  one a c t o r  
1 c o n t  . 
w i t h i n  a  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i l l  be  i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  carry 
o u t  h i s  w i l l  d e s p i t e  r e s i s t a n c e . . . "  ( 1 9 4 7 ,  p . 1 5 2 ) .  One 
s h o u l d n ' t  be t r i c k e d  h e r e  by t h e  common appearance  o f  t h e  
word " p r o b a b i l i t y "  s i n c e  Weber's d e f i n i t i o n  i s  n o t  a t  a l l  
t h e  same a s  t h e  i d e a  of power as a  change i n  p r o b a b i l i t y  
c o n t i n g e n t  on t h e  a c t i o n s  of t h e  i n f l u e n c e r .  
my probability of voting for Candidate Xwas, let,us say, 
. 7  before talking to my respected friend and . 9  after the 
conversation. The shift from . 7  to . 9  in the probability 
of xy choice represents the exercise of power or influence. 
It will be useful to have some specific-terms to refer 
to these probabilities in a more general way. First, we 
need to refer to tlie probability that a person will choose 
a given alternative before the alleged exercise of power 
has occurrl-d. Let's call this the before probability or Pb. 
Second, we need to refer to the probability that a person, 
will choose a given alternative after the alleged exercise 
bf power has occurred. Let's call this the after probabil- 
ity or P . 'Power has been successfully exercised if and a 
only if there is a difference between Pa and Pb. 
The simplicity of this definition is deceptive. There 
are an array of both conceptual and operational problems. 
. . . .  
The conceptual issues include such nettles as anticipated . .  
. . 
reactions, the stimulation of counteractivity by one's ac- 
tions, and negative power. I have had my say on these 
. . 
elsewhere (Gamson, 1968, pp. 68-91) and have nothing to add. 
here. The operational difficulties are formidable enough 
and will occupy the balance of this essay. 
Operationalizing Power: Objective Probability 
One may wonder, when he confronts the problems of 
operationalizing the probability conception of power, whether 
the dividend I have offered with such glowing promises is 
any b l e s s i n g  a l l . .  If it b r i n g s  some c o n c e p t u a l  c l a r i t y ,  
p e r h a p s  t h i s  i s  o f f s e t  by t h e  c l i f f i .cu1- t ies  o f  p u t t i n g  it 
i n t o  p r a c t i . c a 1  u s e  i n  r e s e a r c h .  Pe rhaps  t h e  t o u t e d  d i v i -  
dend w i l l  t u r n  o u t  t o  be a w h i t e  e l e p h a n t  which h a s  some- 
how g o t t e n  i n t o  t h e  s t r e e t s  a f t e r  a l l .  
H e r e ' s  t h e  problem. Imagine t h a t  we want t o  know 
w h e t h e r  indivj.dt!lal A e x e r c i s e s  i n f l u e ~ c e  o v e r  t h e  v o t i n g  
d e c i s i o n s  of Senator X an.3, i f  s o ,  t o  what d e g r e e .  Our 
i n i t i a l  approach  t f ~  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  might  c o n s i s t  of t h e  
I' f o l l o w i n g  e a s i l y  made o b s e r v a t i o n s .  We o b s e r v e  t h e  t o t a l  
s e t  o f  S e n a t o r  X ' s  v o t i n g  d e c i s i o n s .  We n o t e  t h o s e  occa-  
s i o n s  on which M r .  A h a s  a t t e m p t e d  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  o u t -  
come o f  Senat013 X ' s  v o t e .  We can t h e n  c a l c u l a t e  two con- 
d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s :  
1. The p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  S e n a t o r  X w i l l  v o t e  f o r  M r .  
A ' s  p r e f e r e n c e s  when M r .  A does  n o t  a t t e m p t  i n f l u e n c e ;  
2 .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  S e n a t o r  X w i l l  v o t e  f o r  M r .  
A ' s  p r e f e r e n c e s  when he  a c t i v e l y  t r i e s  t o  g e t  S e n a t o r  X t o  
do  s o .  
I f  we have  a s u b s t a n t i a l  number o f  c a s e s  i n  e a c h  c l a s s ,  
we c a n  compare t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  and we shou ld  
be  a b l e  t o  make mean ingfu l  s t a t e m e n t s  a b o u t  t h e  power M r .  A 
h a s  e x e r c i s e d .  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  i f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
M r .  A g e t t i n g  f a v o r a b l e  v o t e s  i s  h i g h e r  when he  a t t e m p t s  
i n f l u e n c e  t h a n  when h e  d o e s n ' t ,  we have  a p p a r e n t  e v i d e n c e  
t h a t  he  h a s  ex .e rc i sed  power o v e r  S e n a t o r  X ' s  d e c i s i o n s .  
Furthermore, the degree of difference between these two 
probabilities .gives us an apparently precise measure of the 
exact amount of powsr that Mr. A was able to exercise. 
I use the word apparently because this procedure is, 
in fact, frought with difficulties. First, there is the 
problem of the equivalence of decisions. It is simply not 
true for most purposes that a vote is a vote is a vote. Any 
comparison of probabilities must assume that there are 
certain equivalences in the classes of votes being compared. 
But imagine a situation in which A is active only on pork- 
barrel-issues while he does not attempt influence on such 
major policy questions as the war in Vietnam, unemployment, 
and other matters. We must also assume that he expresses 
his personal preferences to an investigator on those issues 
in which he is inactive -- only thus can we calculate the 
probability of his getting his desires in the absence of 
influence attempts, 
How meaningful can it be to compare Mr. A's probability 
. . 
of getting his preferred alternative in these two situations -- 
one in which he attempts influence and one in which he does 
not? We might easily exaggerate his power by the following 
reasoning: Senator X is personally indifferent on most pork- 
barrel issues and is especially open to influence but on 
major policy questions he is constrained by his own opinions 
and those of his voczl constituents, Since Mr. A is only 
a c t i v e  on  i s s u e s  t h a t  a r e  e a s y  t o  i n f l u e n c e  and  n e v e r  t r i e s  
t h e  h a r d  o n e s ,  h e  may l o o k  v e r y  p o w e r f u l  i n d e e d .  On t h e  
o t h e r  h a n d ,  w e  may j u s t  a s  e a s i l y  u n d e r e s t i m a t e  M r .  A ' s  
i n f l u e n c e .  P e r h a p s  h e . a g r e e s  w i t h  S e n a t o r  X a l r e a d y  on  most 
m a j o r  p o l i c y  i s s u e s  and  t h u s  h a s  no i n c e n t i v e  o r  need  t o  
e x e r c i s e :  i n f l u e n c e  on  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s .  On p o r k - b a r r e l  is- 
s u e s ,  however ,  h e  must  go a l l  o u t  s i n c e  S e n a t o r  X i s  g e n e r a l -  
l y  r e s i s t a n t  t o  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  1 e g i s T a t i o n .  The r e s u l t  
i n  t h i s  case w i l l  be  t o  r e v e a l  M r .  A as h a v i n g  a n e t  minus 
'power s c o r e .  When h e  i s  I n a c t i v e ,  h e  a l m o s t  a l w a y s  g e t s  
h i s  p r e f e r r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e  b u t  when h e . i s  a c t i v e  and  t r i e s  
h a r d ,  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  s u c c e s s  i s  much l o w e r .  
T h i s  example d o e s  n o t  seem t o o  f a r  f e t c h e d  and  y e t  it 
7 
l e a v e s  o u r  c o m p a r i s o n s  o f  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a m e a n i n g l e s s  shamb- 
l e s .  Nor i s  it s o l v e d  by d rawing  n a r r o w e r  c o n t e n t  c a t e g o r -  
i e s  o f  d e c i s i o n  -- f o r  example ,  t a x  v o t e s  o r  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
v o t e s .  The a s s u m p t i o n  o f  e q u i v a l e n c y  w i t h i n  s u c h  c a t e g o r -  
i e s  r e m a i n s  and  i s  j u s t  as d i f f i c u l t  t o  meet. S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  
t h e r e  must  b e  e q u i v a l e n c y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  two t h i n g s  f o r  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  c o m p a r i s o n s  t o  be m e a n i n g f u l :  
1. The a v e r a g e  b e f o r e  p r o b a b i l i t y  ( P b )  must  be  t h e  
same f o r  t h e  two classes o f  d e c i s i o n s  -- t h o s e  i n  whihh M r .  A 
a t t e m p t s  i n f l u e n c e  a n d  t h o s e  i n  which h e  d o e s n ' t .  
2 .  The a v e r a g e  d e g r e e  of c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  and  a t t e m p t e d  
i n f l u e n c e  f rom o t h e r s  must be t h e  same f o r  t h e  two classes 
of d e c i s i o n s .  
These-  a r e  e x t r e m e l y  f o r m i d a b l e  e q u i v a l e n c y  r e q u i r e -  
men t s  --  f o r m i d a b l e  enough t o  r e n d e r  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  above 
o f  q u e s t i o n a b l e  u s e f u l n e s s  i n  p r a c t i c e .  
A s  s e r i o u s  as t h i s  problem i s ,  t h e r e  i s  a n o t h e r  t h a t  
i s  p e r h a p s  even  more s o .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
powex> seems t o  l e a d  u s  o f f  i n  a d i r e c t i o n  t h a t  i s  n o t  rea l -  
l y  where  w e  want t o  go.: To s w i t c h  m e t a p h o r s ,  it i s  t h e  
wrong t o o l  f o r  t h e  j o b ,  What w e  want i s  a n  a p p a r a t u s  t h a t  
w i l l  a l l o w  u s  among o t h e r  t h i n g s  t o  make power s t a t e m e n t s  
a b o u t  u n i q u e ,  n o n - r e c u r r i n g  s i t u a t i o n s .  We are  l e d  i n s t e a d  
t o  compare c l a s s e s  of d e c i s i o n s  s o  t h a t '  w e  c a n  examine t h e  
r e l a t i v e  f r e q u e n c y  o f  p r e f e r r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  
o r  a b s e n c e  o f  a l l e g e d  i n f l u e n c e .  
What d o e s  t h i s  c o n c e p t i o n  a l l o w  u s  t o  s a y  a b o u t  w h e t h e r  
Kennedy ' s  sympathy c a l l  t o  Mrs. M a r t i n  L u t h e r  King i n f l u e n c e d  
t h e  outcome o f  t h e  1960 e l e c t i o n  o r  E i s e n h o w e r ' s  p l e d g e  t o  
go t o  Korea i n f l u e n c e d  t h e  outcome o f  t h e  1952 e l e c t i o n .  
O r ,  a t  a n  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  l e v e l ,  w e  want t o  know i f  S m i t h ' s  
p a s s i o n a t e  p l e a  swayed t h e  Board o f  T r u s t e e s  f rom t h e i r  
a p p a r e n t  e a r l i e r  i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  c u t  t h e  f u n d s  f o r  t h e  new 
b u i l d i n g .  Our c o n c e p t i o n  of  power o u g h t  t o  a l l o w  u s  t o  make 
s t a t e m e n t s  a b o u t  classes o f  e v e n t s  t h a t  have  o n l y  one  mem- 
be r - -  t h e  one  w e i r e  r e a l l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t a l k i n g  a b o u t .  
O~eration&lising Power: Subjective Probability 
To talk about power.over a single decision, we must 
necessarily abandon the notion of objective probability. 
Objective p:.obability is inseparable from the idea of rela- 
tive frequency of a given outcome and there is no meaning- 
ful way of talking zboct the relative frequency of an out- 
come on a uzique occaslon -- it either occurs or it doesn'lt. 
Subjecti.ve probability is a different matter and I 
offer it as our salvation. The fact is that we talk all the 
time about the probability of single events and we act on 
these subjective probabilities. A whole industry is built 
very successfully around such probabilities and its members 
will be happy to quote you precise odds on a wide variety of 
unique events -- the probability tkat Baltimore will win the 
World Series, the probability that the Detroit Lions will 
win the Super Bowl, or lest anyone think I am being friv- 
olous, the probability that Richard Wixon will be re-elected. 
The first thing we must struggle against, is the notion 
that because a judgment is subjective it is unreliable, un- 
stable, idiosyncratic, or unmeasureable. Subjective probabil- 
ities are stable, reliable, and measurable. As a collective 
phenomenon, they are an objective part of the social world, 
independent of our whims and wishes. 
To make this clearer,..let me introduce a new concept -- 
that of the "true" subjective probability of a given event. - 
The true subjective probability is the mean probability o,g. a 
distribution o f  subjective probability judgments by informed 
observers. 
By a n  i n f o r m e d  o b s e r v e r ,  I mean one  who knows a l l  the  i n -  
f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  i s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  f o r m i n g  a judgment .  Be-. 
c a u s e  t h e r e  a r e :  many f a c t o r s ,  i n fo rmed  o b s e r v e r s  w i l l  have 
some v a r i a n c e  i n  t h e i r  judgment b u t  t h e r e  i s  r e a s o n  t o  
e x p e c t  t h e s e  judgments  t o  be  n o r m a l l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  e x c e p t  
when t h e  e v e n t  i n  q u e s t i o n  h a s  a n  e x t r e m e l y  h i g h  o r  low 
s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  o c c u r r e n c e .  
I t  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  n o t  e a s y  t o  know what t h i s  t r u e  
s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s .  Even i f  w e  are  o u r s e l v e s  i n -  
formed o b s e r v e r s ,  w e  may be  d e v i a n t  o r  i d i o s y n c r a t i c  i n  o u r  
judgment .  A s ample  o f  one  t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  mean o f  a d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n  i s  a p o o r  one  no ImaTter how p e r c e p t i v e  t h e  one  
may b e .  I n  s h o r t ,  one  d o e s  n o t  u s e  h i s  own I estimate o f  
t h e p r o b b i l i t y  as a measure  o f  t h e  t r u e  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y .  
Gamblers  have  a n  e x c e l l e n t  d e v i c e  f o r  e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  
t r u e  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a g i v e n  p o p u l a t i o n .  They 
o f f e r  o d d s  and  a d j u s t  them t o  t h e  way i n  which t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  
p l a c e s  i t s  b e t s .  L e t  u s  s a y  t h a t  t h e y  p l a c e  t h e  o d d s  a t  
2 - 1  a g a i n s t  Muskie  g a i n i n g  t h e  Democra t i c  P r e s i d e n t i a l  nomi- 
n a t i o n .  I f  t h e y  f i n d  t h a t  many are w i l l i n g  t o  b e t  on  Muskie 
a t  t h e s e  o d d s  a n d  f e w  a r e  w i l l i n g  t o  b e t  a g a i n s t  h im,  t h e y  
w i l l  l o w e r  t h e  o d d s  -- p e r h a p s  t o  3-2. On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  
p e r h a p s  many w i l l  b e t  a g a i n s t  Muskie a t  t h e  o r i g i n a l  odds  
and  f e w  w i l l  t a k e  a chance  i n  h i s  f a v o r  -- t h e n  t h e y  w i l l  
ra ise t h e  o d d s ,  p e r h a p s  t o  3-1. The s h i f t s  i n  odds  are a 
s e a r c h  f o r  t h e  t r u e  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  and t h e y  w i l l  
s t a b i l i z e  when t h e y  r e a c h  t h e  mean -- a b o u t  as many 
people will bet for Muskie as against him. The variance around 
this mean, of course, is what makes horse races and election bets. 
Once one has accepted the idea of a true subjective probabil- 
ity, we can -- with some additional specifications -- use this in 
measurement of the exercise of power. First, if we are interested 
in power, we must limit our attention to those events which are 
under the control of targets of potential influence. In other 
words, the events must be the decisions of men. In studying social 
power, we are not interested in the subjective probability of 
whether it will rain tomorrow; we are interested in the probability 
that the State Legislature will pass a proposed no-fault insuzance 
bill, that voters will pass a proposed school bond issue, or that 
the President will withdraw troops from Indochina. To be related 
to a measure of power, the subjective probability in question must 
refer to the probability that a particular alternative will be chos- 
en by an actual or potential target of influence. -
The most meaningful subjective probabilities are those held by 
these targets of influence. Even if the target is a single indi- 
vidual, the idea of subjective probability remains valid. To illus- 
trate this, assume that the decision of concern is whether Paofes- 
sor Jones will accept an attractive offer from another university. 
He has promised to give an answer in 30 days, but he is able to tell 
us that he "probably" will accept the offer. When pressed to be spe- 
cific, he tells us that there are two chances in three that he will 
accept. Subsequently, his wife is offered an attractive position at 
his present University and a new interview reveals a change in his 
subjective probability. He now suggests that he is quite likely 
to remain at his present job, rating the chances of accepting the 
competitive offer at only one in five. Here we have a situation in 
which the target's subjective probability ha.s changed significant- 
ly and we can infer influence even though the actual decision has 
still not actually been made. 
- 
The measurement process is similar when the decision is a col- 
lective one. Members of the target are asked to estimate the prob- 
ability that the decision-making body of which they are a member 
will act in a particular fashion. Thus, they are asked to report 
partly on their own actions and partly on their anticipation of the 
actions of others. They are, in effect, serving as particularly 
well-informed observers who have two advantages over other observers. 
First, they have special and unparalleled access to their own re- 
actions and second, they have a high probability of exposure to the 
thinking and feelings of other members of the decision-making body. 
I 
These advantages distinguish them from other observers only 
in making them better informed. Empirically, this presumption may 
turn out to be false in some cases. Some set of observers, by their 
more systematic efforts and attention, may be better informed than 
members of the target group on the likely actions of that body. A 
journalist who regularly covers Congress may be in a better position 
to know how Congressmen are lpaning on an up-coming vote than many 
members who are junketing, repairing fences in their home district, 
or otherwise preoccupied. Similarly, the President's analyst.may be 
a better judge than the President himself of his likely decision on 
a matter which is heavily involved with unconscious impulses. 
The point of these, examples is to underline the fact that the 
essential criterion for judging subjective probability is being an 
informed observer,of the body making the decision. The focus on 
the judgments of the decision-making group itself rests on a pre- 
sumption that may well be discarded in given cases -- that a group 
is likely to be especially well informed on its own likelihood'of 
taking particular actions. 
One final element is-necessary to use .subjective probability 
as a measure of how much influence has occurred. So far, we have 
suggested that we ask a group of decision-makers or other informed 
observers to estimate the probability at Time One that the group 
will make a particular decision. We then repeat this same question 
to the group at some subsequent time. If we find a difference in 
the two subjective probability estimates (beyond any fluctuations 
thatlcould-be attributed to measurement error), we have merely es- 
tablished an effect. Something has influenced our decision-makers 
but we cannot yet say that it is an act of social influence. It 
may be some factor beyond the.conscious control of men or some un- 
intended byproduct of unrelated decisions. Our difference between 
pb and Pa establishes a necessary.but-not a sufficient condition 
for inferring that social influence has occurred.. 1f.there is no 
difference, then we can dismiss any claims about the success of. 
influence attempts; if there is a difference, WE are still left 
with the problem of identifying social influence as the cause.. 
Ongy those affects on subjective probabilities which can be 
attributed to the acts of men aimed at altering the outcome of a 
decision should qualify for social influence. Unintended acts of 
men clearly can have important effects on decisions but it merely 
contributes conceptual confusion to include these as acts of in- 
fluence. Social influence is clearest when a single act of intend- 
ed influence has occurred between the measurement of Pb and Pa, a 
situation which is most likely to occur when we take frequent read- 
ings of subjective probability. If we then find a difference be- 
tween the before and after probabilities in the intended direction,' 
we can say that social influence has occurred and the difference in 
size tells us how much. Thus we have a neat way of using the prob- 
ability concept of power to allow us to make precise, measurable 
statements about the exercise of power in the case of single, non- 
recurring events. 
I'm sure I must defend this idea so let me deal with several 
possible objections. What I am arguing is sometimes misunderstood 
in the following way. "You are dealing with reputation for influence," 
I am told, "rather than actual influence. Maybe the reputation is 
deserved in some cases but these informant judgments about influence 
I 
are notoriously unreliable. There is no guarantee that someone has 
r e a l l y  e x e r c i s e d  power j u s t  because  a l o t  o f  p e o b l e  happen 
t o  t h i n k  t h i s  -- t h e y  may be  s u b j e c t  t o  s i m i l a r  p e r c e p t u a l  
d i s t o r t i o n s .  You can  f o o l  a l l  o f  t h e  p e o p l e  some o f  t h e  
t i m e  , 
Now I c o m p l e t e l y  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  above argument b u t  it 
happens  t o  be q u i t e  i r r e l e v a n t  f o r  my s u g g e s t i o n  a b o u t  meas- 
u r i n g  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  power. The argument assumes t h a t  
p e o p l e  a r e  b e i n g  asked  t o  make judgments abou t  whe the r  a n  
a c t  h a s  been i n f l u e n t i a l  o r  n o t  b u t  I am n o t  s u g g e s t i n g  
a n y t h i n g  of  t h e  s o r t .  The o n l y  judgment t h e  informed ob- 
s e r v e r s  a r e  a sked  t o  make c o n c e r n s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  o 
outcome o f  a g i v e n  e v e n t  a t  d i f f e r e n t  p o i n t s  i n  t i m e .  The 
b e s t  t e c h n i q u e  f c r  d i s c a v e r i n g  t h e i r  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  . .  
i s  t o  o f f e r  them b e t s  on t h e  outcome a t  v a r i o u s  o d d s ,  ask-  
i n g  them t o . c h o o s e  which s i d e  t h e y  would b e t  on .  T h e i r  
i n d i f f e r e n c e  p o i n t  -- t h e  p o i n t  a t  which t h e y  c a n ' t  d e c i d e  
which way t h e y  would b e t  -- e s t a b l i s h e s  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  sub- 
j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  about  t h e  outcome.  Nowhere a r e  t h e y  
asked  t o  make any judgment a b o u t  why - t h e y  may have changed 
from a n  e a r l i e r  e s t i m a t e ;  nowhere a r e  t h e y  asked t o  specu- 
l a t e  on whether  any g iven  a c t  l e d  them t o  change.  They 
a r e  s imply  b e i n g  used t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  and d e g r e e  
o f  a  s h i f t  i n  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  an  outcome -- n o t  t h e  c a u s e s  
o f  t h e  s h i f t .  . . - 
One might argue that .their attributions of causality-are 
inevitably ef5ecting.thei.r judgment. Perhaps Congress has been 
donsidering a bill which has only - lukewarm Administration support. 
The President then goes on national television and strongly..endorses 
the bill,-implying a willingness to put further efforts behind it.. 
Isn't a Congressman who raises his estimate before and after-the 
speech relying,on his (perhaps faulty) attribution of the.Presi- 
dentls.influence on Congress? 
There is no doubt that the attributions which observers make. 
are affecting their subjective probabi1iti.e~. Still-, there- is a 
difference.in estimating the probability of--an outcome and.in-es- 
timating what caused an increase or decrease in probability. Per- 
haps in many cases these judgments will-be perfectly correlated -- 
the.more'one thinks' that the President has influence over Congress, 
the greater will be the rise in subjective probability of Congress 
passing.the bill after,the President supports it. 
However, there is.an important, systematic bias in certain 
attribution judgments that is attentuate.d or absent when merely 
judging the likelihood of outcomes. The bi,as stems from the gen- 
eral unwillingness of targets of influence to attribute influence.. 
to agents whose tactics they ,dislike. . Pressure- may work but it,is 
the rare politician indeed who admits he acted because,of it. 
Thus, there is some reason to expect systematic denial of certain 
kinds of attributions but there is little or no reason for distor- 
tion if one is merely asked to state the present probability of an 
outcome without regard to the tactics that may have influenced it. 
Of course, if the informant is aware of the nature of the inferences 
behg made from his probability estimates, he-may be tempted again 
to distort his reports to affect the inferences. But the separa- 
tion of the attribution task from the estimate of probable outcome 
promises to reduce if not fully eliminate this tendency. 
Even if we accept the fact that the observers are providing 
us with honest judgments, perhaps they are ignorant and incompetent. 
If one uses unreliable informants here, as in any other study, the 
resulting measures will be correspondingly less reliable. Those 
who know little and are bad judges have difficulty making judgments 
and will produce a high variance in any test-retest reliability 
check. But surely one is not helpless here. I have suggested pick- 
ing the decision-makers themselves as particularly well-info~med ob- 
servers. If they form a large group many of whom are ill-quali- 
fied to judge the probable outcome, one is free to establish strict- 
er qualifications. Clearly, any investigator using this technique 
will face the challenge of showing that-his informants were in a .  
position to make intelligent judgments about how the decision- 
making body would act -- that they had the information, .access, 
and interest to.make their collective judgment an informed one. 
Suppose one's observers are well-informed but biased. There 
is some reason to suspect that.subjectihe probability judgments are 
not independent of one's feelings about the desirability of the 
outcome. . Wishful thinking may.be affecting the judgment of.mapy 
observers, perhaps quite unconsciously. Thus,. they may exaggerate 
the likelihood of getting desired outcomes and bias the measure.. 
This argument may hoJd for individual judgments but its 
implications are much less clear for the collective measure. 
To the extent that there is a division among the raters on the 
outcome desired, they will shift their estimates in opposite 
directions. This will have the effect of increasing the vari- 
ance of the subjective probability estimate. But even if there 
is bias here, it appears to be a constant bias as likely to be 
present at both Time One and Two. If there is a change between 
these two periods, it is hard to see how one's feelings about : 
the outcome could produce the shift. 
Another problem centers on disentangling any single in- 
fluence attempt from a whole variety of events and other acts 
that may have occurred in the interval between Time One and 
Time Two. This problem must also be viewed in a more general con- 
text. Measuring the effect of an attempted act of influence is a 
special case of causal analysis. The problem we face is no dif- 
ferent from the general one of asserting that Variable X has afb 
fected Variable Y. It is always possible that our statement is 
false because of spurious effects -- that both were being inde- 
pendentJ.y'affe~ted by Variable Z, for example. 
- - The a p p r o a c h  t o  .:n:i.:; p r o b l e m  i s  e s s e n t 5 : ~ ' i i j i  t h e  same 
w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  i>;eas::yement of power as  i t  i s  more gen- 
e r a & l y .  We t r y  as  much as p o s s i b l e  t o  i s o l a t e  t h e  e f f e c t  
of t h e  zct  o f  i n t e r e s t  f rom o t h e r  p o s s i b l e  c a u s e s .  One 
n a y  do t h i s  by u s i n g  small t i m e  i n t e r v a l s - -  t h a t  i s ,  by 
m e a s u r i n g  t h e  t r u e  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  as soon as p o s s i b l e  
a f ~ e r  a n y  ac* of .  i n t e r e s t  o r  c o n t a m i n a t i n g  e v e n t  h a s  oc-  
c u r r e d .  Let u s  s a y ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h a t  w e  a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
w h e t h e r  t h e  ' endor semen t  o f  C a n d i d a t e  X by S e i l a t o r  Y h a s  
improved t h e   candidate.'^ c h a n c e s  o f  e l e c t i o n .  I t  a l s o  hap- 
p e n s  t h a t  C a n d i d a t e  X has had  a n  i l l e g i t 3 m a t e  c h i l d  i n  h i s  
y o u t h  and t h i s  f ac t  i s  b r o u g h t  t o  l i g h t  a few d a y s  b e f o r e  
t h s  e n d o r s e m e n t .  I f  we have  a p a n e l  o f  i n f o r m e d  o b s e r v e r s ,  
w e  measure  t h e .  ' t r u e  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  b e f o r e  e i t h e r  
t h e  endor semen t  o r  t h e  r e v e l a t i o n ,  w e  r emensure  it a f t e r  
. . 
t h e  . r e v e l a t i o n  of  y o u t h f u l  i n d i s c r e t i o n  bu r  b e f o r e  t h e  
e n d o r s e m e n t ,  and  w e  measure  it a g a i n  a f t e r   he e n d o r s e m e n t .  
C l e a r l y  t h i s  w i l l  n o t  work i f  a c t s  znd e v e n t s  o c c u r  
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . .  We w i l l  have  o n l y  n e t  e f f e c t s  h e r e  and  w e  
mus t  r e l y  on  w h a t e v e r  o u t s i d e  e v i d e n c e  and  a r g u m e n t a t i o n  we 
c a n  m u s t e r . t o  d i s e n t a n g l e  t h e . e l e m e n t s  i n  t h e  n e t .  T h e r e  
m i g h t  b e , s o n e  l i m i t e d  v a l u e  i n  o b t a i n i n g  h y p o t h e t i c a l . s u b -  
j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  judgments .  F o r  example ,  what o d d s  would 
you nave  a c c e p t e d  on  S e n a t o r  Kennedy b e i n g  nominated  i f  
Chappaqu id ick  had  n o t  o c c u r r e d ?  Such judgments  s h o u l d  be 
.taken w i ~ h  a heavy grain of salt since changing one impor- 
tant element forces one to make a host of assumptions about 
secondary effects on other elements. Since these assump- 
tions are likely to be highly vax..:.nble and implicit ones, 
the reliability of the attendant judgment is dubious. None- 
theless, viewed as an attem~t to decompose and assess simul- 
taneous events or acts, it nay give a few useful clues on 
relative weights. 
Summarv 
I am arguing for a rather simple and straightforward 
way of measuring the exercise of power over specific de- 
cisions of interest. First, one creates a panel of 
informed observers..,These panel members are ,,assumed to 
have or are given a common set of relevant information and 
asked to fill out a short questionnaire which measures 
whether they are sufficiently knowledgeable about the situation 
being studied. Those who fail to meet some threshold of know- 
ledge are eliminated. - 
The panel members are then given a certain amount of 
money -- real or hypothetical -- and asked to consider 
whether they would bet this money for or against a given 
outcome at vsrious odds. For any given set of odds, one 
will then have a percentage of bets for or against the 
alternative. The entire distribution of odds will enable 
;-: 3 .c .z. c. . . .  . - , ,~ar,l . lsr:  -the p o i n t  a t  w;c.ic:? 3xc ' i : J . y  na1.f t h e  in- 
formed o b ~ e ~ ~ i : : ' ~  bet each way. Oze can also g a i n  a rAe?-sux 
- .  . . 
~f co: l r idence  by  a i l o w i n g  p e o p l e  to 1-ccr!uce -the anounr_ -rl!c:y 
would b e t  as t h e y  a p p r o a c h  their s u b j e c t i v e  i n d i f f e r e n c e  
. , .  
p o i n ~ .  T h i s  a l s o  o p e n s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  u s i n g  a we~c-..- a. < A ,  Lcc2
mean o f  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  judgments  -- we iqh tec?  !3y tile 
d e g r e e  o f  c o n f i d e n c e  t h a t  e a c h  i n d i v i d u a l  p l aces  i n  his 
judgment  . 
. T n i s  procedu-re  i s  the:.: ~ e p e a t e d  a t  regi.:l.ar i n t e r v a l s  
d u r i n g  a p e r i o d  i n  which a-L-cempis t o  i n i i u e n c e  t h e  o u t c o n e  
o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  were o c c u r r i n g  a n d  as soon  as p o s s i b l e  zfre? a n y  
i n f l u e n c e  a t t e m p t  o f  spec ia l  i n t e r e s t .  A ramp1.e questionnaire 1. . . 
embodying t h i s  p r o c e d u r e  i s  i n c l u d e d  h e r e  as Appendix A .  
Does o n e  need  a l a r g e  p a n e l ?  This d e p e n d s  on t h e  v z r i -  
a n c e  o f  t h e  s c b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  j udgmen t s .  1.15; h u ~ c h  -- 
a n d  it i s  o n l y  t h i s  -- i s  t h a t  t h e  v a r i a n c e  i s  s u r p r i s i n g -  
l y  low and  t h a t  a v e r y  s m a l l  p a n e l  would do t?ie j o b .  I 
. . 
h a v e  f o u n d ,  for example ,  t i lat  I c a n  pa the l ?  a c c u r a t e l y  p r e -  
d i c t  t h e  o d d s  t h a t  w i l l  be a v a i l a b l e  o n  major s p o r t s  events 
w i t h  a p a n e l  or' as f e w  as f i v e  ' o r  s i x  p e o p l e .  The more 
~ n a j p r ~  e v e n t  a n d ,  h e n c e ,  t h e  m o r e  a t t e n t i v e  t h e  ob- 
s e 1 7 v e ~ - s ,  t he  l o w z r  t h e  v a r i a n c e  a n d  t h e  s m a l l e r  t h e  p a n e l  
neec-jed r o  accu:?a?e ly  estimate t h e  t p u e  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l -  
ity. If one  is ral]ci . i?g,  fc.:? z:.:;j.j;!i>l.~, z~!>ou-~ the outcarfie 1:1f 
a  p r e s i d e n t i a l  el.ec-i:ion, t n e n  I k m ~ i d  g u e s s  tszt a p??.zel cf 
t h o u s a n d s  would o f f e r  l i t t l e  improvement  o v e r  a p a n e l  of 
- - o i l l y  26 o r  3 0  c l o s e  e l e c t i o n  .cn;atci-le~:s. ~ . r  t h e  c i e c i s i o n  o f  
i n t e r e s t  i s  o b s c u r e ,  khen o n e  would e x p e c t  the  v a r i a n c e  of 
s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i . t y  judgments  t o  r i s e  c o n s i d e r a b l y  znc: 
a - somewhat  l a r g e r  p a n e l  would bc n e c e s s a r y  t o  measllre t h e  t r u e  
s u b j e c t i v e  - .  p r o b a b i l i t y w i t h i n  c7 g i v e n  range of e r r o r .  
So ,  t h e  p romised  d5vider.d.  I . s ,  I c 1 2 i m ,  o f  c o n s i d e - z b l e  
v a l u z  a f t e r  a l l .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  power i s  
n o t  o n l y  m e a s u r e a b l e  b u t ,  i f  one  r e l i e s  on s u b j e c t i v z  prob-  
a b i l i t y ,  one  may g e t  a f i r s t  c lass  b a r g a i n ,  I o f f e r  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  c o n c e p t i o n  t o  s t u d e n t s  of i n t e r p e r s o n a i  power 
. as  a B e s ~  Buy. 
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Appendix A 
Measuring Subjective Probability: Sample Questionnaire 
Date 
Introduction: . The Senate Assembly, as .you know, 'will be taking action 
on a proposal to eliminate most~classified~military research from the 
University.. We are interested in how Senate Assembly members like 
yourself think this decision is going to come out. Three possibil- 
. .  - ities exist: 
Alternative A: The proposal to eliminate most classified 
military research will be passed. 
Alternative B: A compromise will be passed whi.ch eliminates 
some but not most of such research. 
Alternative C: The proposal will-be rejected.or tabled allow- 
ing the present system to continue. 
1. Which of.these possibilities is.the most likely outcome .in your 
judgment? 
(circle one) 
2 ;  Which do you personally prefer? 
(circle one) A B C 
3. . What probability would you attach to each of these alternatives? 






.4. A list of hypothetical bets on the ou.tcome.are listed below. 
Would you indicate which of .these bets you would accept at 
this time (assuming that you have no objections to betting 
as such) . 
Check if you 
accept the bet 
a. You win $100 if Alternative A is passed; you 
lose $10 if it isn't. 
b. You win- $50 if Alternative A is passed;.you 
lose $10 if it isn't. 
c. You win $30 if Alternative A is passed;, you 
lose $10 if ik isn't. 
d. You win $20 if.Alternative A is passed; you. 
lose ,$lo if it isn't., 
e. You win $15 if Alternative A is passed; you . 
lose $10 if it isn't. 
f. You win $10 if -Alternative A is-passed; you' 
lose $10 if it isn't. 
g. you.win $10 .if,Alternative A is passed; you 
: ,-.l~se $15.' if '.it- i-sn,'t. 
h. You win $10 if Alternative A is passed; you 
lose $20 if.it isn't. 
i. . You win $10 if A1ternative.A is.passed;'you. 
lose $30 if it isn't. 
j. You win $10 if.Alternative A is passed; you 
lose $50 if it isn't. 
k.. You win $10 if AlternativeA is passed; you 
lose $100'if it isn't., 
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1 
The area of  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  power i s  b e s e t  by a hand i -  
c a p  t h a t  a n a l y s t s  o f  community, n a t i o n a l ,  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  ' .::. . . 
power have  been a b l e  t o  avo id .  The hand i cap  i s  t h e  appa ren t -  
l y  i n n o c e n t  a ssumpt ion  t h a t  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  power shou ld  be 
t h o u g h t  o f  a s  t h e  power t h a t  one i n d i v i d u a l  h a s  oven a n o t h e r .  
Even when it i s  r ecogn i zed ,  as it f r e q u e n t l y  i s ,  t h a t  such 
power r e l a t i o n s  may be  a  two-way s t r e e t ,  the  assumpt ion re- 
i. 
mains a s t r a i g h t - j a c k e t .  
The problem w i t h  t h i n k i n g  o f  power as a r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between peop l e  i s  t h a t  it d e p r i v e s  t h e  d i s c o u r s e  o f  a n  i n t e l -  
l e c t u a l  a p p a r a t u s  t h a t  ha s  proved v e r y  u s e f u l  i n  t a l k i n g  
abou t  power r e l a t i o n s  . in  l a r g e r  un i t s . .  Only the . .  s l - i g h t e s t  
change i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  make t h i s  a p p a r a t u s  a v a i l a b l e .  F i r s t ,  . . 
l e t ' s  speak  of power o v e r  behav io r  r a t h e r , t h a n  power o v e r  
a p e r s o n .  T h i s  means t h a t  we r e l i n q u i s h  o u r  c l a i m  t o  be 
d e a l i n g  w i t h  changes  i n  a t t i t u d e s ,  v a l u e s ,  l e a r n i n g ,  and 
o t h e r  i n t e r n a l  s t a t e s  excep t  i n  s o  fa r  as w e  must i n v o k e .  
such  c o n c e p t s  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  mechanisms by which power oper-  
ates on b e h a v i o r .  We l e a v e  t h e  domain o f  e x p l a i n i n g  
changes  i n  i n t e r n a l  s t a t e s  t o  o t h e r  s u b - f i e l d s  o f  s o c i a l  
psychology -- mora l  and c o g n i t i v e  development ,  v a l u e  and 
a t t i t u d e  change ,  and t h e  l i k e .  
Second,  l e t ' s  t h i n k  abou t  t h e  b e h a v i o r  b e i n g  e x p l a i n e d  
i n  a s p e c i f i c  way -- as t h e  d e c i s i o n s  o r  t h e  c h o i c e  among 
alternatives that an individual makes. This is hardly any 
limit at all because it is a simple matter to cast most be- 
havi0.r in these terms. Virtually-any action may be viewed 
as an implicit:.choice among possible alternatives even if 
the other members of the decision set were never conscious- 
ly considered. Many choices will be trivial ones of little 
interest or concern so we must specify the domain that is 
important to us -- the choice of a political candidate to 
vote for, the decision to take a job or buy a product, the 
choice of a policy to advocate and support, and so forth. 
What I am proposing is that we redefine the task of 
an interpersonal power analysis. Instead of attempting to 
make statements about:..how much or what.kind of power A has 
over B, we should kpeak instead of how much and what kind 
of power A has over a specified domain of Bts decisions. 
The dividend we receive for this change i.5 the employment 
of the highly useful conceptualization of power as a change 
in probability. 
L 
The Probability Conception of Power 
The explicandum for interpersonal power analysis is .the 
set of decisions that an individual makes. But only part 
of the explanation lies within the realm of power. Many 
effects on a person's decisions may have nothing to do with 
the behavior of other actors but may reflect his internal 
states, natural events, the physical environment, and so 
forth. Clearly, a power explanation has certain more .specific 
characteristics. 
For a n  i n t u i t i v e  f e e l i n g  o f  where t h e  explanaTion 
i i e s ,  I l i k e  t h e  s t o r y  abou t  t h e m a n  who e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  
and r e p e a t e d l y  t h r ew  b i t s  o f  newspaper i n  t h e  s t r e e t .  One 
. . 
morning,  a  woman who had watched t h i s  p e r f o r m a n c e , f o r  sev-  . . . ,  . ' . '  
e r a 1  months approached him and asked  him what he  w a s  do ing .  
" I ' m  th rowing  t h i s  paper  down t o  keep  t h e  e l e p h a n t s  o u t  o f  
t h e  s t r e e t s , ' '  h e  t o l d  h e r .  "But t h e r e  a r e  no e l e p h a n t s  
i n  t h e  s t r e e t s , "  she  reproached  him. " T h a t ' s  r i g h t ; "  
h e  s a i d  t r i u m p h a n t l y ,  " E f f e c t i v e ,  i s n ' t  it." 
C l e a r l y ,  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  poweb.must imply some change 
o v e r  t h e  k ind  o f  d e c i s i o n  t h a t  an  i n d i v i d u a l  o r  a n  e l e p h a n t  
would make i n  t h e  absence  o f  such  power e x e r c i s e .  But what 
o f  a  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which I would p robab ly  have  vo t ed  f o r  
Candida te  X anyway b u t  as a r e s u l t o f  my c o n v e r s a t i o n  w i t h  
a r e s p e c t e d  ' f r i e n d  I became more c e r t a i n  o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n ?  
S u r e l y  t h e r e  i s  some k ind  o f  i n f l u e n c e  o r  power b e i n g  exer -  
c i s e d  h e r e  b u t  c an  one  s ay  my d e c i s i o n  w a s  a l t e r e d  s i n c e  I 
p roba b ly  would have vo ted  t h e  same way anyway? 
We can  s a y  t h i s  q u i t e  e a s i l y  i f  we conce ive  o f  t h e  ex- 
e r c i s e  o f  power as a n  act  which i n c r e a s e s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
t h a t  I w i l l  choose  a p r e f e r r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e  o f  t h e  i n f l u e n c e r .  
To conce ive  o f  i n f l u e n c e  as a s h i f t  o f  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  one o f  
Rober t  D a h l t s  . (1957)  s eve ra .1 -magn i f i c en t  and s emina l  c o n t r i -  
b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  a r e a - o f  power' a n a l y s i s  .' I n  t h e  example above,  . . 
. . 
Some peop le  i n c o r r e c t l y  c r e d i t  Weber w i t h  t h i s  i d e a  be- 
c a u s e  he  spoke o f  power a s  " t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  one a c t o r  
'cont . 
w i t h i n  a s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i l l  be i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  c a r r y  
o u t  h i s  w i l l  d e s p i t e  r e s i s t a n c e . .  .." . ( 1 9 i / 7 ,  p .152) .  One 
s h o u l d n ' t  be t r i c k e d  h e r e  by t h e  common appearance of t h e  
word " p r o b a b i l i t y "  s i n c e  Weber's d e f i n i t i o n  i s  no t  a t  a l l  
t h e  same a s  t h e  i d e a  of .power  as a change i n  p r o b a b i l i t y  
con t ingen t  on t h e  a c t i o n s  of  t h e  i n f l u e n c e r .  
.$ , * .  
my p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  v o t i n g  f o r  C a n d i d a t e  X w a s ,  l e t  u s  s a y ,  
; 7  b e f o r e  t a l k i n g  t o  my r e s p e c t e d  f r i e n d  and .9  a f t e r  t h e  
c o n v e r s a t i o n .  The s h i f t  f rom . 7  t o  .9 i n  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
o f  my c h o i c e  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  power o r  i n f l u e n c e .  
I t  w i l l  be  u s e f u l  t o  have  some s p e c i f i c  t e r m s  t o  r e f e r  
I 
f o  t h e s e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  i n  a , m o r e  g e n e r a l  way. F i r s t ,  we 
need t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  a  p e r s o n  w i l l  choose  
a g i v e n  a l t e r n a t i v e  b e f o r e  t h e  a l l e g e d  e x e r c i s e  o f  power 
h a s  o c c u r r e d .  L e t ' s  c a l l  t h i s  t h e  b e f o r e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o r  Pb. 
s e c o n d ,  we need t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  a p e r s o n  
w i l l  choose  a g i v e n  a l t e r n a t i v e  a f t e r  t h e  a l l e g e d  e x e r c i s e  
o f . p o w e r  h a s  o c c u r r e d .  L e t ' s  c a l l  t h i s  t h e  a f t e r  p r o b a b i l -  
i t y  o r  P  . Power h a s  been s u c c e s s f u l l y  e x e r c i s e d  i f  and a 
o n l y  i f  t h e r e  i s  a  d i f f e r e n c e  between Pa and Pb. 
4 
The s i m p l i c i t y  o f  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  d e c e p t i v e .  There  
a r e  a n  a r r a y  o f  b o t h  c o n c e p t u a l  and o p e r a t i o n a l  problems.  
c o n c e p t u a l  i s s u e s  i n c l u d e  such  n e t t l e s  as a n t i c i p a t e d  
r e a c t i o n s ,  t h e  s t i m u l a t i o n  o f  c o u n t e r a c t i v i t y  by o n e ' s  ac- 
t i o n s ,  and n e g a t i v e  power. I have  had my s a y  on t h e s e  
er1sewhere (Gamson, 1968 ,  pp .  68-91) and have  n o t h i n g  t o  add 
h e r e .  The o p e r a t i o n a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  are f o r m i d a b l e  enough 
and w i l l  occupy t h e  b a l a n c e  of t h i s  e s s a y .  
O p e r a t i o n a l i z i n g  Power: O b j e c t i v e  P r o b a b i l i t y  
One may wonder,  when h e  c o n f r o n t s  t h e  problems o f  
I t  
o p e r a t i n n a l . i n g  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  power, whe the r  
/. 
" t h e  d i v i d e n d  I have  o f f e r e d  w i t h  such  g lowing p romises  i s  
any b l e s s i n g  a t  a l l .  If it b r i n g s  some c o n c e p t u a l  c l a r i t y ,  
pe rhaps  t h i s  i s  o f f s e t  by t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  p u t t i n g  it  
i n t o  p r a c t i c a l  u s e  i n  r e s e a r c h .  Perhaps  t h e  t o u t e d  d i v i -  
dend w i l l  t u r n  o u t  t o  be a  w h i t e  e l e p h a n t  which h a s  some- 
! 
how g o t t e n  i n t o  t h e  s t r e e t s  a f t e r  a l l .  
H e r e ' s  t h e  problem. Imagine t h a t  we want t o  know 
whether  i n d i v i d u a l  A e x e r c i s e s  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  t h e  v o t i n g  
d e c i s i o n s  o f  S e n a t o r  X and,  i f  s o ,  t o  what d e g r e e .  Our 
i n i t i a l  approach t o  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  might  c o n s i s t  o f  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  e a s i l y  made o b s e r v a t i o n s .  We obse rve  t h e  t o t a l  
s e t  o f  Sena to r  X ' s  v o t i n g  d e c i s i o n s .  We n o t e  t h o s e  occa-  
s i o n s  on which M r .  A h a s  a t t emp ted  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  ou t -  
come o f  Senatov X ' s  v o t e .  We can  t h e n  c a l c u l a t e  two con- 
d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s :  
c 1. The p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  S e n a t o r  X w i l l  v o t e  f o r  M r .  
A ' s  p r e f e r e n c e s  when M r .  A does  n o t  a t t e m p t  imf luence ;  
2 .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  S e n a t o r  X w i l l  v o t e  f o r  M r .  
A ' s  p r e f e r e n c e s  when he  a c t i v e l y  t r i e s  t o  g e t  S e n a t o r  X t o  
do s o .  
I f  we have a s u b s t a n t i a l  number o f  cases i n  e ach  c l a s s ,  
we can  compare t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t e i s  and w e  should  
be a b l e  t o  make mean ingfu l  s t a t e m e n t s  abou t  t h e  power M r .  A 
h a s  e x e r c i s e d .  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  i f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
M r .  A g e t t i n g  f a v o r a b l e  v o t e s  . is  h i g h e r  when h e . a t t e m p t s  
i n f l u e n c e  t h a n  when h e  d o e s n ' t ,  we have a p p a r e n t  ev idence  
t h a t  he  h a s  e x e r c i s e d  power o v e r  S e n a t o r  X ' s  d e c i s i o n s .  
Furthermore, the degree of difference between these two 
probabilities gives us an apparently precise measure of the 
exact amount of power that Mr. A was able to exercise. 
I use the word apparently because this procedure is, 
in fact, frought with difficulties. First, there is the 
problem of the equivalence of decisions. It ,is simply not 
true for most purposes that a vote is a vote is a vote. Any. 
comparison of probabilities must assume that there are 
certain equivalences in the classes of votes being compared. 
But imagine a.situation in which A is active only on pork- 
barrel-issues while he does not attempt influence on such 
major policy questions as the war in Vietnam, unemployment, 
and other matters. We must also assume that he expresses 
his personal preferences to an investigator on those issues 
in which he is inactive -- only thus can we calculate the 
probability of his getting his desires in the absence of 
influence attempts, 
How meaningful can it be to compare Mr. A's probability 
of getting his preferred alternative in these two situations --. 
one in which he attempts influence and one in which he does 
nbt? We might easily exaggerate his power by the following 
reasoning: Senator X is personally indifferent on most pork- 
barrel issues and is especially open to influence but on 
major policy questions he is constrained by his own opinions 
and those of his vocal constituents. Since Mr. A is only 
a c t i v e  on i s s u e s  t h a t  a r e  e a s y  t o  i n f l u e n c e  and n e v e r  t r i e s  
t h e  h a r d  o n e s ,  he may look ve ry  power fu l  i n d e e d .  On t h e  
o t h e r  hand , ,we  may j u s t  a s  e a s i l y  u n d e r e s t i m a t e  M r .  A ' s  
i n f l u e n c e .  Pe rhaps  he  a g r e e s  w i t h  S e n a t o r  X a l r e a d y  on most 
n a j o r  p o l i c y  i s s u e s  and t h u s  h a s  no i n c e n t i v e  o r  need t o  
e x e r c i s e : . i n f l u e n c e  on t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s .  On p o r k - b a r r e l  is-  
s u e s ,  however,  he  must go a l l  o u t  s i n c e  S e n a t o r  X i s  g e n e r a l -  
l y  r e s i s t a n t  t o  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  l e g i s t a t i o n .  The r e s u l t  
$n t h i s  c a s e  w i l l  be t o  r e v e a l  M r .  A as h a v i n g  a n e t  minus 
power s c o r e .  When h e  i s  i n a c t i v e ,  h e  a l m o s t  a lways  g e t s  . . 
h i s  p r e f e r r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e  b u t  when h e  i s  a c t i v e  and t r i e s  
h a r d ,  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  s u c c e s s  i s  much l o w e r .  
T h i s  example d o e s  n o t  seem t o o  f a r  f e t c h e d  and y e t  it 
l e a v e s  o u r  compar isons  o f  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a  m e a n i n g l e s s  shamb- 
l es .  Nor i s  it s o l v e d  by drawing n a r r o w e r  c o n t e n t  c a t e g o r -  
i es  o f  d e c i s i o n  -- f o r  example, t a x  v o t e s  o r  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
v o t e s .  The assumpt ion  o f . e q u i v a l e n c y  w i t h i n  such  c a t e g o r -  
i es  r e m a i n s  and i s  j u s t  a s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  meet .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  
t h e r e  must b e  e q u i v a l e n c y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  two t h i n g s  f o r  t h e  , 
p r o b a b i l i t y  compar isons  t o  be m e a n i n g f u l :  
I 
1. The a v e r a g e  b e f o r e  p r o b a b i l i t y  ( P b )  must be  t h e  
same f o r  t h e  two c l a s s e s  o f  d e c i s i o n s  -- t h o s e  i n  whibh M r .  A 
a t t e m p t s  i n f l u e n c e  and t h o s e  i n  which h e  d o e s n ' t .  
2 .  The a v e r a g e  d e g r e e  o f  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  and a t t e m p t e d  
i n f l u e n e e  from o t h e r s  must be t h e  same f o r  t h e  two classes 
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o f  d e c i s i o n s .  
T h e s e  a r e  e x t r e m e l y  f o r m i d a b l e  e q u i v a l e n c y  r e q u i r e -  
ments  -- f o r m i d a b l e  enough t o  r e n d e r  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  above 
o f  q u e s t i o n a b l e  u s e f u l n e s s  i n  p r a c t i c e .  
A s  s e r i o u s  as t h i s  problem i s ,  t h e r e  i s  a n o t h e r  t h a t  
i s  p e r h a p s  even more s o .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
power seems t o  l e a d  u s  o f f  i n  a d i r e c t i o n  t h a t  i s  n o t  r e a l -  
l y  where we want t o  go-; To s w i t c h  metaphors ,  it i s  t h e  
wrong t o o l  f o r  t h e  job .  What we want i s  a n  a p p a r a t u s  t h a t  
w i l l  a l l o w  u s  among o t h e r  t h i n g s  t o  make power s t a t e m e n t s  
a b o u t  u n i q u e ,  n o n - r e c u r r i n g  s i t u a t i o n s .  We a r e  l e d  i n s t e a d  
t o  compare c l a s s e s  o f  d e c i s i o n s  s o  t h a t  we can  examine t h e  
r e l a t i v e  f r e q u e n c y  o f  p r e f e r r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  
o r  a b s e n c e  o f  a l l e g e d  i n f l u e n c e .  
What d o e s  t h i s  c o n c e p t i o n ~ a l l o w  u s  t o  s a y  a b o u t  whether  
Kennedy's  sympathy c a l l  t o  M r s .  M a r t i n  Lu the r  King i n f l u e n c e d  
t h e  outcome o f  t h e  1960 e l e c t i o n  o r  E i senhower ' s  p l e d g e  t o  
go t o  Korea i n f l u e n c e d  t h e  outcome o f  t h e  1952 e l e c t i o n .  
O r ,  a t  a n  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  l e v e l ,  we want t o  know i f  S m i t h ' s  
p a s s i o n a t e  p l e a  swaye'cj t h e  Board o f  T r u , s t e e s  from t h e . i r  
a p p a r e n t  e a r l i e r  i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  c u t  t h e  f u n d s  f o r  t h e  new 
b u i l d i n g .  Our c o n c e p t i o n  o f .  power ough t  t o  a l l o w  u s  t o  make 
s t a t e m e n t s  abou t  c l a s s e s  of e v e n t s  t h a t ' h a v e  o n l y  one mem- 
ber- -  t h e  one w e ' r e  r e a l l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t a l k i n g  a b o u t .  
O p e r a t i o n a l i z i n g  Power: S u b j e c t i v e  P r o b a b i l i t y  
To t a l k  abou t  power o v e r  a s i n g l e  d e c i s i o n ,  we must 
n e c e s s a r i l y  abandon t h e  n o t i o n  o f  o b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y .  
O b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  i n s e p a r a b l e  from t h e  i d e a  o f  r e l a -  
t i v e  f requency  o f  a  g i ven  outcome and t h e r e  i s  no meaning- 
f u l  way o f  t a l k i n g  abou t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  f requency  o f  an  ou t -  
come on a unique o c c a s i o n  -- it e i t h e r  o c c u r s  o r  it d o e s n ' t .  
S u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  a  d i f f e r e n i t  matter and I 
o f f e r  i t  as o u r  s a l v a t i o n .  The fac t  i s  t h a t  w e  t a l k  a l l  t h e  
t ime  abou t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s i n g l e  e v e n t s  and we a c t  on 
t h e s e  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s .  A whole i n d u s t r y  i s  b u i l t  
v e r y  s u c c e s s f u l l y  around such p r o b a b i l i t i e s  and i t s  members 
w i l l  be happy t o  quo t e  you p r e c i s e  odds on a wide v a r i e t y  o f  
unique  e v e n t s  -- t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t .  Oakland w i l l  winl- the 
World S e r i e s ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  D e t r o i t  Lions  w i l l  
win t h e  Super Bowl, o r  l e s t  anyone t h i n k  I am be ing  f r i v -  
o l o u s ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  R ichard  Nixon w i l l  be  r e - e l e c t e d .  
The f i r s t  t h i n g  we must s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t ,  i s  t h e  n o t i o n  
t h a t  because  a judgment i s  s u b j e c t i v e  it i s  u n r e l i a b l e ,  un- 
s t a b l e ,  i d i o s y n c r a t i c ,  o r  unmeasureable .  There  i s  no r e a s o n  
why it. should  be any o f  t h e s e  t h i n g s .  
Let  m e  i n t r o d u c e  a new concept : - -  t h a t  o f  t h e  " t r u e "  
s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a g'iven e v e n t .  The t r u e  sub j ec -  
t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  t h e  mean p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  s u b j e c t i v e  probability judgments by informed o b s e r v e r s .  
By a n  informed o b s e r v e r ,  I mean one who knows a l l  t h e  i n -  
f o rma t ion  t h a t  i s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  forming a  judgment. Be -  
c ause  t h e r e  a re !  many f a c t o r s ,  informed o b s e r v e r s  w i l l  have 
'some v a r i a n c e  i n  t h e i r  judgment b u t  t h e r e  i s  r e a s o n  t o  
e x p e c t  t h e s e  judgments t o  be normal ly  d i s t r i b u t e d  e x c e p t  
when t h e  e v e n t  i n  q u e s t i o n  ha s  a n  ex t r eme ly  h i g h  o r  low 
s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  o c c u r r e n c e .  
I t  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  n o t  e a s y  t o  know what t h i s  t r u e  
s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s .  Even i f  w e  are o u r s e l v e s  i n -  
'formed o b s e r v e r s ,  we may be d e v i a n t  o r  i d i o s y n c r a t i c  i n  o u r  
judgment. A sample o f  one t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  mean o f  a  d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n  i s  a  poor  one  no'mat . ter .how p e r c e p t i v e  t h e  one  
may be .  I n  s h o r t ,  one does  n o t  u s e  h i s  own i e s t i m a t e  o f  
t h e  & a b i l i t y  as a measure o f  t h e  t r u e  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y .  
Gamblers have  a n  e x c e l l e n t  d e v i c e  f o r  e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  
t r u e  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a g i v e n  p o p u l a t i o n .  They 
o f f e r  odds and a d j u s t  them t o  t h e  way i n  which t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  
p l a c e s  i t s  b e t s .  Let  u s  s ay  t h a t  t h e y  p l a c e  t h e  odds a t  
2 - 1  a g a i n s t  Muskie g a i n i n g  t h e  Democrat ic  P r e s i d e n t i a l  nomi- 
n a t i o n .  I f  t h e y  f i n d  t h a t  many are w i l l i n g  t o  b e t  on Muskie 
a t  t h e s e  odds  and few a r e  w i l l i n g  t o  b e t  a g a i n s t  him, t h e y  
w i l l  l ower  t h e  odds -- perhaps  t o  3-2. On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  
pe rhaps  many w i l l  b e t  a g a i n s t  Muskie a t  t h e  o r i g i n a l  odds  
and few w i l l  t a k e  a chance  i n  h i s  f a v o r  -- t h e n  t h e y  w i l l  
r a i s e  t h e  odds ,  pe rhaps  t o  3-1. The s h i f t s  i n  odds are a  
s e a r c h  f o r  t h e  t r u e  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  and t h e y  w i l l  
s t a b i l i z e  when t h e y  r e a c h  t h e  mean -- abou t  as many 
. 
p e o p l e  w i l l  b e t  f o r  Muskie a s  a g a i n s t  him. The v a r i a n c e  ; 
around t h i s  mean, o f  c o u r s e ,  i s  what makes h o r s e  r a c e s  and 
e l e c t i o n  b e t s .  
Once one h a s  a c c e p t e d  t h e  i d e a  o f  a t r u e  s u b j e c t i v e  
p r o b a b i l i t y ,  we c a n  r a t h e r  q u i c k l y  move t o  u s i n g  t h i s  i n  
t h e  measurement o f  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  power. We s t a r t  w i t h  
Time One and e s t i m a t e  t h e  t r u e  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a  
g i v e n  a l t e r n a t i v e .  For  s i m p l i c i t y ,  imagine  t h a t  a  s i n g l e  
act  o f  a t t e m p t e d  i n f l u e n c e  t h e n  o c c u r s .  We t h e n  e s t i m a t e  
t h e  new t r u e  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  g i v e n  a l t e r n a -  
t i v e .  If t h e r e  i s  a  d i f f e r e n c e  between Pb and Pa i n  ?he 
i n t e n d e d  d i r e c t i o n ,  t h e n  we can  s a y  t h a t  i n f l u e n c e  h a s  oc- 
c u r r e d  and t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  s i z e  t e l l s  u s  how much. Thus 
we have  a  n e a t  way o f  u s i n g  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  c o n c e p t  o f  
power t o  a l l o w  u s  t o  make p r e c i s e ,  measureab le  s t a t e m e n t s  
a b o u t  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  power i n  t h e  q a s e  o f  s i n g l e ,  non- 
r e c u r r i n g  e v e n t s .  
I ' m  s u r e  I must de fend  t h i s  i d e a  s o  l e t  me d e a l  w i t h  
s e v e r a l  p o s s i b l e  o b j e c t i o n s .  What I am a r g u i n g  i s  sometimes 
misunders tood  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  way. "You a r e  d e a l i n g  w i t h  
r e p u t . a t i o n  f o r  i n f l u e n c e , "  I a m  t o l d ,  " r a t h e r  t h a n  a c t u a l  
i n f l u e n c e .  Maybe?the r e p u t a t i o n  i s  d e s e r v e d  i n  some c a s e s  
b u t  t h e s e  i n f o r m a n t  judgments a b o u t  i n f l u e n c e  a r e  n o t o r -  
i o u s l y  u n r e l i a b l e .  There  i s  no g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  someone h a s  
: r e a l l y  e x e r c i s e d  power j u s t  b e c a u s e  a l o t  of p e o p l e  happen 
:to t h i n k  t h i s  -- t h e y  may be  s u b j e c t  t o  s i m i l a r  p e r c e p t u a l  
P i ~ t o ~ t i o n s .  You can  f o o l  a l l  o f  t h e  p e o p l e  some o f  t h e  
;time . 
t Now I c o m p l e t e l y  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  above argument b u t  it 
happens  t o  be q u i t e  i r r e l e v a n t  f o r  my s u g g e s t i o n  abou t  meas- 
u r i n g  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  power. The argument assumes t h a t  
.people a r e  b e i n g  asked  t o  make judgments  a b o u t  whether  an  
act  h a s  been i n f l u e n t i a l  o r  n o t  b u t  I am n o t  s u g g e s t i n g  
a n y t h i n g  o f  t h e  s o r t .  The o n l y  judgment t h e  informed ob- 
s e r v e r s  a r e  a sked  t o  make c o n c e r n s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  o 
outcome o f  a g i v e n  e v e n t  a t  d i f f e r e n t  p o i n t s  i n  t i m e .  The 
b e s t  t e c h n i q u e  f o r  d i s c a v e r i n g  t h e i r  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
L s  t o  o f f e r  them be t . s  on t h e  outcome a t  v a r i o u s  odds ,  ask-  
i n g  them t o  choose  which s i d e  t h e y  would b e t  on .  T h e i r  
i n d i f f e r e n c e  p o i n t  -- t h e  p o i n t  a t  which t h e y  c a n ' t  d e c i d e  
which way t h e y  would b e t  -- e s t a b l i s h e s  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  sub- 
j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  a b o u t  t h e  outcome.  Nowhere a r e  t h e y  
a s k e d  t o  make any judgment a b o u t  why t h e y  may have changed -
from a n  e a r l i e r  e s t i m a t e ;  nowhere a r e  t h e y  asked  t o  specu- 
l a t e  on whe the r  any g i v e n  a c t  l e d  them t o  change.  They 
a r e  s imply  b e i n g  used  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  and d e g r e e  
o f  a  s h i f t  i n  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a n  outcome -- n o t  t h e  c a u s e s  
o f  t h e  s h i f t .  I n  s h o r t ,  t h e  argument  a b o u t  s t u d y i n g  r e p u t a -  
t i o n - ' . f o r  i n f l u e n c e  i s ,  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  a comple te  r e d  h e r r i n g .  
1 
But perhaps the "informed" observers we have picked 
are, in fact, ignorant and incompetent. This problem is a 
real one, The assumption of complete information is diffi- 
cult to meet in practice and information can greatly affect 
one's subjective probability even when no new acts are 
occurring. The disclosure of a previously unknown fact may 
greatly shift such a probability. Furthermone, in any ac- 
tual situation, there is likely to be differential infor- 
mation. 
. . 
These are important difficulties but not overwhelming 
ones. In many cases, most of the relevant information is 
publicly available to those who are interested. Further- 
more, the act~of disclosure of some previously unknown fact . . 
may itself be treated as an act 6f influence. In any case, 
events are clearly effecting the true subjective probabil- 
ity -- sickness, accidents, etc. -- as well as' deliberate 
acts of attempted influence. 
If onw uses unreliable informants, the resulting mea- 
sure will be correspondingly less reliable. Those who know 
little and are bad judges have difficulty making judgments 
and will produce a high variance in any test-retest r@li- 
ability check. -. --There ;:are a tvarZ~ty-~.~8:::-tgchniques:f or asses- 
sing reliability and for imporving it. My major point here 
is simply that the problems of reliability involved are 
standard ones and a.battery of standard techniques exists 
for dealing with them. 
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Another problem centers on disentangling any single 
influence'attempt from a whole variety of events and other 
acts that may have occurred in the interval between Time 
One and Time Two. This problem must also be viewed in a 
more general context. Measuring the effect of an attempt- 
ed act of influence is a special case of causal~analysis. 
The problem we face is no different from the general one of 
asserting that Variable X has affected Variable Y. It is 
,always possible that our statement is false because of 
spurious effects -- that both were being independently 
affected by Variable Z, for example. 
The approach to this problem is essentially the same 
with regard to the measurement of power as it is more gen- 
erally'. We try as much as .po$sible to isolate the effect 
of the act of interest from other possible causes. One 
may do this by using small time intervals-- that is, by 
measuring the true subjective probability as soon as possible 
after any act of interest or contaminating event has oc- 
curred. Let us say, for example, that we are interested in 
whether the endorsement of Candidate X by Senator Y has 
improved the candidate2s chances of election. It also hap- 
pens that Candidate X has had an illegitjmate child in his 
youth and this fact is brought to light a few days before 
the endorsement. If we have a panel of informed observers, 
-we measure the true subjective probability before either 
.the endorsement or the revelation, we remeasure it after 
the:arevelation of youthful indiscretion but before the 
endorsement, and we measure it again after the endorsement. 
Clearly this will not work if acts and events occur 
simultaneously. We will have only net effects here and we 
must rely on whatever outside evidence and argumentation we 
can muster to disentangle the elements in the net. There 
might be some limited value in obtaining hypothetical sub- 
jective probability judgments. For example, what odds would 
you have accepted on Senator Kennedy being nominated if 
Chappaquidick had not occurred? Such judgments should be 
taken with a heavy grain of salt since changing one.impor- 
tant element forces one to make a host of assumptions about 
secondary effects on other elements. Since these assump- 
tions are likely to be highly variable and implicit ones, 
the reliability of the attendant judgment is dubious. None- 
theless, viewed as an attempt to decompose and assess simul- 
taneous events or acts, it may give a few useful clues on 
relative weights. 
Summary 
I am arguing for a rather simple and straightforward 
way of measuring the exercise of power over specific de- 
cisions of interest. First, one creates a panel of informed 
observers. These panel members.are.given a common set of 
1 
r e l e v a n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  and asked t o  f i l l  o u t  a s h o r t  q u e s t i o n -  
n a i r e  which measures  whether  t h e y  a r e . : s u f f i c i e n t l y  know- 
l e d g e a b l e  a b o u t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  s t u d i e d .  Those who f a i l  
t o  meet some t h r e s h o l d  of  knowledge a r e  e l i m i n a t e d .  
The p a n e l  members a r e  t h e n  g i v e n  a c e r t a i n  amount o f  
money -- r e a l  o r  h y p o t h e t i c a l  -- and a s k e d  t o  c o n s i d e r  
whe the r  t h e y  would b e t  t h i s  money f o r  a r  a g a i n s t  a g i v e n  
outcome a t  v a r i o u s  odds .  For any g i v e n  s e t  o f  o d d s ,  one 
w i l l  t h e n  have  a  p e r c e n t a g e  of b e t s  f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e .  The e n t i r e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  odds  w i l l  e n a b l e  
one t!o e s t a b l i s h  t h e  p o i n t  a t  which e x a c t l y  h a l f  t h e  i n -  
formed o b s e r v e r s  b e t  e a c h  way. One c a n  a l s o  g a i n  a measure 
o f  c o n f i d e n c e  by a l l o w i n g  p e o p l e  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  amount t h e y  
would b e t  as t h e y  approach  t h e i r  s u b j e c t i v e  i n d : i f f e r e n c e  
p o i n t .  
T h i s  p r o c e d u r e  i s  t h e n  r e p e a t e d  a t  r e g u l a r  i n t e r v a l s  
d u r i n g  a p e r i o d  i n  which a t t e m p t s  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  outcome 
o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  were o c c u r r i n g  and as soon as p o s s i b l e  a f t e r  
any act  o r  e v e n t  o f  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t .  A sample q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
embodying t h i s  p rocedure  i s  i n c l u d e d  h e r e  as Appendix A.  
Does one need a  l a r g e  p a n e l ?    his depends on t h e  v a r i -  
a n c e  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  judgments .  My hunch -- 
and it i s  o n l y  t h i s  -- i s  t h a t  t h e  v a r i a n c e  i s  s u r p r i s i n g -  
l y  low and t h a t  a v e r y  s m a l l  p a n e l  would do  t h e  job .  I 
have  found ,  f o r  example,  t h a t . 1  c a n  r a t h e r  a c c u r a t e l y  p re -  
d i c t  t h e  odds t h a t  w i l l  b e ' a b a i l a b l e  on  major  s p o r t s  e v e n t s  
w i t h  a p a n e l  o f  a s . f e w  as f i v e  o r  s i x  p e o p l e .  The more 
major  t h e  e v e n t  a n d , . a n d  hence ,  t h e  more a t t e n t i v e  t h e  ob- 
s e r v e r s ,  t h e  lower  t h e  v a r i a n c e  and t h e  smaller t h e  p a n e l  
I 
needed t o  a c c u r a t e l y  e s t i m a t e  t h e  t r u e  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l -  
i t y .  I f  one i s  t a l k i n g ,  f o r  example ,  abou t  t h e  outcome of  
a  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n ,  t h e n  I would g u e s s  t h a t  a p a n e l  of 
t h o u s a n d s  would o f f e r  l i t t l e  improvement oGer a p a n e l  o f  
o n l y  2 0  o r  3 0 .  If t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  i n t e r e s t  i s  o b s c u r e ,  t h e n  
one would e x p e c t  t h e  v a r i a n c e  of s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
judgments t o  r i s e  c o n s i d e r a b l y  and a somewhat l a r g e r  p a n e l  
would he n e c e s s a r y  t o  mea-sure t h e  t r u e  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l -  
i t y  w i t h i n  a g i v e n  r a n g e  o f  e r r o r .  
So, t h e -  promised d i v i d e n d : . i s ,  I c l a i m ,  o f  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
v a l u e  a f t e r  a l l .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  power i s  
n o t  o n l y  measureab le  b u t ,  i f  one r e l i e s  on s u b j e c t i v e  prob- 
a b ' i l i t y ,  one may g e t  a  f i r s t  class barga in , '  I o f f e r  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  t o  s t u d e n t s  o f  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  power 
. a s  a  Bes t  Buy. 
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Appendix A 
Measuring S u b j e c t i v e  P r o b a b i l i t y :  Sample Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
( F i l t e r .  Ques t i ons  
How c l o s e l y  have you been f o l l o w i n g  t h e  e f f o r t s  o f  
v a r i o u s  c a n d i d a t e s  t o  o b t a i n  t h e  Democrat ic  P r e s iden -  
t i a l  nominat ion f o r  1 9 7 2  -- v e r y  c l o s e l y ,  f a i r l y  c l o s e l y ,  
o r  n o t  t o o  c l o s e l y .  
( C i r c l e  o n e )  Very c l o s e l y  F a i r l y  c l o s e l y  Not t o o  c l o s e l y  
Who would you c o n s i d e r  t o  be t h e  major  c a n d i d a t e s ?  
2a.  Do you happen t o  remember what s t a t e  e ach  one i s  from? 
Name S t a t e .  . . 
3 .  A s e r i e s  o f  c h o i c e s  w i l l  be  d e s c r i b e d  below. Imagine t h a t  
you w i l l  g e t  t h e  amount o f  money i n d i c a t e d  i f  you choose  
c o r r e c t l y  b u t  n o t h i n g  i f  you a r e  wrong. P l e a s e  i n d i c a t e  
what your - : cho ice  would be i n  e a c h  case. 
Example : (Check one)  
A.  It w i l l  r a i n  tomorrow. (Value i f  c o r r e c t  = $95)  - 
B .  It w i l l  n o t  r a i n  tomorrow. (Value i f  
c o r r e c t  = $ 5 )  
. .A 
If you choose  A and it r a i n s ,  you g e t  $95; i f  you choose 
A and it d o e s n ' t  r a i n ,  you g e t  n o t h l n g .  I f  you choose B 
and it d o e s n ' t  r a i n ,  you g e t  $5; if you choose  B and it 
r a i n s ,  you g e t  n o t h i n g .  
3 .  F o l l o w i n g  t h e  same p r o c e d u r e ,  p l e a s e  i n d i c a t e .  your  c h o i c e  f o r  
e a c h  p a i r  d e s c r i b e d  below r e g a r d i n g  S e n a t o r  Musk ie ' s  c h a n c e s  
of  b e l n g  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  o b t a i n i n g  t h e  Democra t i c  P r e s i d e n t i a l  
(Check o n c i n  e a c h  
. . 1 a+: i.. . M ~ ~ k i e . C i l l : : b e * : ~ ~ ~ e e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .  " Value = $9 Of i>$  p a i r  ) 
1 a- :.Moikie w i l l -  b e  u n s u c c e s s W 1 .  Value $10 
:h+::-^.MusHe i!wf 11-:.be . suc^cess fu l  . Value = $8 0  
b- Muskie w i l l  be  u n s u c c e s s f u l .  Value = $20 
i 
c+ Muskie w i l l  be  s u c c e s s f u l .  Value = $70 
c-  Muskie w i l l  b e  u n s u c c e s s f u l .  Value $30 
d* Muskie w i l l  b e  s u c c e s s f u l  Value = $60 
[ d- Muskie w i l l  be  u n s u c c e s s f u l  Value  = $40 - 
( e +  Muskie w i l l  be  s u c c e s s f u l .  Value = $50 
l e -  Muskie w i l l  b e  u n s u c c e s s f u l .  Value  = $50 
f +  Muskie w i l l  b e  s u c c e s s f u l .  Value = $40 
f -  Muskie w i l l  be  u n s u c c e s s f u l .  Value  = $60 
ga Muskie w i l l  b e  s u c c e s s f u l .  Value = $30 
g- Muskie w i l l  b e  u n s u c c e s s f u l .  Value $70 - 
Muskie w i l l  be  s u c c e s s f u l .  Value = $20 
h- Muskie w i l l  b e  u n s u c c e s s f u l .  Value = $80 
1 Muskie w i l l  be  s u c c e s s f u l .  Value = $10 
i- Muskie w i l l  b e  u n s u c c e s s f u l .  Value $90 
\ 
. - - 
T h i s  r e f e r s  t o  h i s  s u c c e s s  i n  g a i n i n g  t h e  Democra t ic  nomina- 
t i o n  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  w h e t h e r  h e  i s  l a t e r  e l e c t e d  o r  n o t .  
it* T h i s  amount i s  what you r e c e i v e  i f  you choose  t h i s  a l t e r -  
n a t i v e  and a r e  c o r r e c t .  
4 .  P ledge  c i r c l e  t h e  p a i r  o f  l e t t e r s  i n  q u e s t i o n  # 3  where you had 
t h e  most d i f f i c u l t y  i n  d e c i d i n g  what your c h o i c e  shou ld  be .  
( F o r  example,  a + / a - ,  b+ /b- ,  C + / c - ,  e t c , ) .  
